Bogus Employment Behind the Wheel: When Government Presents in Statistics, Absent in Protection for Online Ride-Hailing (Ojol) Drivers

  • 19/06/2025
  • Category: Commentaries
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ojol

Author: Hosea Immanuel Latumahina
Editor: Ayom Mratita Purbandani

 

On May 20, 2025, hundreds of online ride hailing (ojol) drivers held a demonstration and deactivated the application (offbid) simultaneously in a massive escalation, in various big cities, at several points in the city center. These ojol drivers criticized the low level of wages, the implementation of non-transparent commission deductions, and the polemic over the merger initiation between two giant ride-hailing, namely Gojek and Grab, which have the potential to increase distortion and precarity for the position of ojol drivers in future projections.[1] [2]

The Ministry of Transportation’s Research and Development Agency survey (2019) showed that the average daily income of online ojol drivers ranges from IDR 50,000 to IDR 100,000, with working hours of 6 to 12 hours per day, relatively comparable to the hours of formal workers.[3] However, the hours they dedicate are not directly proportional to the protection they receive. Statistically, ojol drivers are categorized as informal workers. Informal workers are defined as active workers who work with short or irregular working hours, under the auspices of non-incorporated companies, and without an employment contract, thereby lacking legal dependency on the company.[4] [5] [6] From a regulatory standpoint, ojol drivers are classified as “independent contractors” as regulated in Law Number 20 of 2008 concerning MSMEs regarding partnership relations. Consequently, ojol drivers fall outside the scope of labor law protection according to Law Number 13 of 2003 concerning Manpower, which has not specifically regulated partnership-based employment relations.[7]

This disharmony between statistical recognition, social reality, and legal legitimacy underpins the phenomenon of ‘bogus employment’ in Indonesia’s digital work ecosystem, particularly in the ride-hailing industry. This phenomenon reveals paradoxical logic; statistically, ojol drivers are recorded as part of the active workforce and informal workers; in practice, they work like formal workers (with the number of working hours, dependence on the platform industry, and receipt of work instructions); however, in the legal domain, they are not considered and recognized as workers who have basic employment rights.

Paradox Ride-Hailing: Between Informal Workers and Formal Workers

The phenomenon of bogus employment emerges from the inconsistency between statistical classification, the lived social reality of ojol drivers, and the applicability of existing labor laws to their working conditions. The Central Statistics Agency (BPS) classification records ojol drivers as informal workers in the transportation sector.[8] But in reality, ojol drivers are very far from the characteristics of “informal workers”.

A study by Fairwork Indonesia (2022) reveals that the majority of ojol drivers work more than 40 hours per week and rely entirely on income from the platform as their primary source of livelihood.[9] Similarly, a survey conducted by IDEAS (2023) involving 225 ojol drivers in the Greater Area of Jakarta (Jabodetabek) found that their average monthly net income falls significantly below the regional minimum wage.[10] In fact, the average working duration of ojol drivers reaches 11 hours per day.[11]

Ironically, despite the high intensity of work and disproportionately low income proportion, ojol drivers remain excluded from social protection typically afforded under basic employment rights. This exclusion stems from the legal classification of drivers not as employees, but as “partners” of ride-hailing platforms. This position has implications for the construction of working relations between companies and drivers that are based on partnership model, rather than working relations between employers and workers.[12] In the existing labor law regulations, namely Law No. 13 of 2003 concerning Employment or commonly known as the Employment Law, the employment relationship is defined as “the relationship between employers and workers or laborers based on an employment agreement that has elements of work, wages and orders”.Meanwhile, in Law No. 20 of 2008 concerning Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) which regulates partnership-based working relations, partnership relations are defined as “cooperation in business relations, either directly or indirectly, based on the principle of mutual need, trust, strengthening, and benefit involving Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises with Large Enterprises”.

The second difference between the employment relationship between employer and employee and the partnership relationship is the position or standing of each party involved. Unlike the employee-employer relationship, the partnership relationship is more egalitarian. In terms of position, the positions of the partnering parties are equal, no one controls and is controlled.[13] According to Novianto et al. (2021), the issue of partnership relations between ride-hailing platforms with ojol drivers lies in the classification of drivers as independent contractors. While legally considered “partners,” in practice, drivers often do not receive the rights and protections typically afforded to contractual partners, resulting in an imbalanced and exploitative working relationship.[14]

Socio-Economic Consequences of Pseudo Partnership Status

Ride-hailing platforms justify partnership relationships with ojol drivers by highlighting the flexibility of work and the driver’s autonomy in deciding their work frequency and mechanisms. However, in practice, key aspects of their working mechanism are governed by algorithmic systems. According to Mustika & Savirani (2021), the algorithm-based work ecosystem operates as a form of gamification which allows ojol drivers to meet the conditions that have been required by the platform company to obtain their rights, such as high income, performance-based bonuses, and order prioritization by the algorithm system.[15] Thus, the concept of work flexibility and the prerogative authorization of ojol drivers regarding their work becomes illusory and paradoxical.

Moreover, The classificiation of drivers as “partner” rather than workers has serious implications for their access to basic employment social protection. As a result, ojol drivers are not provided with employment-based social protections, such as BPJS Ketenagakerjaan and Kesehatan, paid leave, compensation for work-related illness, work allowances. They are also highly vulnerable to arbitrary termination of employment by the platform.[16][17]

The misclassification creates structural precarity and facilitates the capitalization and exploitation of the socio-economic conditions of ojol driver. Drivers face low and uncertain income levels, disparities in social benefits received, and the uncertainty of social guarantees and protection provided by the company through partnership-based relationships and algorithmic-based control over drivers.[18][19][20] Another problem in partnership-based working relationships is the dominance of ride-hailing platforms towards ojol drivers in employment relations. On the one hand, these companies still control online drivers through the platform’s algorithmic system, but on the other hand, they simultaneously evade the legal responsibilities of an employer.[21] The asymmetric power dynamic enables ride-hailing platforms to benefit from workers’ labor while avoiding accountability, leaving drivers without the rights and protection they deserve.[22]

For a Fair digital work ecosystem, The State Must be Present

The state holds a responsibility to protect ojol drivers from bogus employment practices, which creates space for hidden labor exploitation practices and deviations in employment status. This obligation becomes even more urgent given that ojol drivers have been statistically recognized as part of the active workforce, with the aggregate number of ojol drivers reaching around 4 million people.[23] However, in reality, the employment law system in Indonesia still only accommodates conventional employment relationship models and has yet to evolve to address the complexities of digital labor arrangements.

Several countries have taken more progressive steps to reform labor regulations in response to the rise of platform-based work. For instance, in 2021, the UK Supreme Court ruled that Uber drivers must be classified as workers, entitling them to the minimum wage and annual leave.[24] Subsequently, the European Commission has proposed a new legal framework aimed at preventing misclassification of platform workers as self-employed.[25] Without taking comparable legal measures, Indonesia will not be able to resolve the dilemmas and problems in the digital work ecosystem.

To address this, it’s time for the Indonesian government to not only be present in statistics, but also to become a protector of workers’ rights behind the scenes of the platform, especially ojol drivers. Immediate action is needed in the form of tripartite dialogue, employment policy reform that is contextual to digital developments, and an inclusive social protection system for online ojek drivers. Without such reforms, ojol drivers will remain in a precarious position–standing on the edge of legal and social abyss of injustice, suspended between the land of formal work and the valley of informal work, and at the risk of falling deeper into the pit of the phenomenon of bogus employment.

  1. Teresia, A. & Asprihanto, H. (2025). Ride-hailing drivers in Indonesia hold protests to demand better pay. Reuters. Available at:https://www.reuters.com/business/world-at-work/ride-hailing-drivers-indonesia-hold-protests-demand-better-pay-2025-05-20/ ↑

  2. Tempo.co (2021). These are the demands that Ojol drivers will convey on May 20. Tempo.co. Available at:https://www.tempo.co/ekonomi/ini-tuntutan-yang-akan-disampaikan-pengemudi-ojol-pada-20-mei-1483926 ↑

  3. Setyowati, D. (2023). Research: Ojol Income is Now Just Enough, Want to Become an Office Worker. Katadata.co.id. Available at:https://katadata.co.id/digital/startup/64265dd56858b/riset-pendapatan-ojol-kini-pas-pasan-ingin-jadi-pekerja-kantoran ↑

  4. WartaGriya.Com. (2025). Revealed! 86 Million Indonesian Citizens Work as Ojol Drivers to Traders. Available at:https://wartagriya.com/2025/05/05/terungkap-86-juta-warga-ri-kerja-jadi-driver-ojol-hingga-pedagang/ ↑

  5. Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS) (2022). Indonesian Labor Market Indicators 2022. Jakarta: BPS RI. ↑

  6. International Labour Organization (ILO) (2003). Guidelines concerning a statistical definition of informal employment. Report I: General Report, 17th International Conference of Labour Statisticians. Geneva: ILO. Tersedia di: https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—dgreports/—stat/documents/normativeinstrument/wcms_087622.pdf ↑

  7. Muhyiddin. (2025). Online Motorcycle Taxis and Pseudo Partnerships, Regulations That Are a Decade Behind. Kompas.id. Available at:https://www.kompas.id/artikel/ojek-online-dan-kemitraan-semu-regulasi-yang-tertinggal-satu-dekade ↑

  8. Central Bureau of Statistics (2023) Condition of Workers in Indonesia August 2023. Jakarta: BPS. Available at:https://www.bps.go.id/id/publication/2023/12/08/1b09be03a0951907a562f755/keadaan-pekerja-di-indonesia-agustus-2023.html ↑

  9. Fairwork Indonesia (2022) Fairwork Indonesia 2022 Ratings: Labour Standards in the Platform Economy. Available at:https://fair.work/en/fw/publications/fairwork-indonesia-2022-ratings-labour-standards-in-the-platform-economy/ ↑

  10. Institute for Demographic and Poverty Studies (2023). The Illusion of Metropolitan Online ojolProsperity. IDEAS. Available at:https://ideas.or.id/2023/08/10/ilusi-sejahtera-ojek-daring-metropolitan/ ↑

  11. Tempo.co (2021). Daily Income of Ojol Drivers. Tempo.co. Available at:https://www.tempo.co/data/data/pendapatan-harian-pengemudi-ojol-1494027 ↑

  12. Annazah, N.S., Tobing, H., Nasution, F.A.P. & Muhyiddin, M. (2023). Working Conditions in Partnership Relations: A Case Study of Online Transportation Company Partners. Journal of Employment, 18(3), 198–212. Available at:https://www.researchgate.net/publication/376899193_Kondisi_Kerja_dalam_Relasi_Kemitraan_Studi_Kasus_pada_Mitra_Perusahaan_Transportasi_Online ↑

  13. Novianto, A. (2022). Unraveling the Problem of Cheap Fares for Online Drivers in Indonesia: From Passenger, Goods, and Food Delivery Service Fares, Bulletin Insight, 3(1), 1–22. Institute of Governance and Public Affairs (IGPA), Universitas Gadjah Mada. Available at:https://map.ugm.ac.id/wp-content/uploads/sites/290/2022/07/Insight-31-Juli-2022_Mengurai-Persoalan-Tarif-Murah-bagi-Pengemudi-Online-di-Indonesia.pdf ↑

  14. Novianto, A., Wulansari, A.D. & Hernawan, A. (2021). Research: Four Reasons Why Gojek, Grab and Maxim Partnerships Are Detrimental to Ojol Drivers. The Conversation, May 1. Available at:https://theconversation.com/riset-empat-alasan-kemitraan-gojek-grab-hingga-maxim-merugikan-para-ojol-159832 ↑

  15. Mustika, W. & Savirani, A. (2021). ‘Ghost Accounts’, ‘Joki Accounts’ and ‘Account Therapy’: Everyday Resistance Among Ride-hailing Motorcycle Drivers in Yogyakarta, Indonesia. The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies, 39(1). Tersedia di: https://doi.org/10.22439/cjas.v39i1.6175 ↑

  16. Kompas.id. (2024). Overlapping Regulations of Partnership Work Relations. Kompas.id. Available at:https://www.kompas.id/baca/opini/2024/03/25/tumpang-tindih-regulasi-hubungan-kerja-kemitraan ↑

  17. Tempo.co. (2025). Online ojol drivers demonstrate: Protesting the partnership work system. Available at:https://www.tempo.co/ekonomi/pengemudi-ojek-online-unjuk-rasa-protes-sistem-kerja-kemitraan–1208102 ↑

  18. Novianto, A., Wulansari, A.D. & Hernawan, A. (2021)Research: Four Reasons Why Gojek, Grab, and Maxim Partnerships Are Detrimental to Ojol. The Conversation Indonesia. Available at:https://theconversation.com/riset-empat-alasan-kemitraan-gojek-grab-hingga-maxim-merugikan-para-ojol-174134 ↑

  19. Wicaksono, A. (2022)Online ojol drivers’ Resistance to Employment Law Loopholes. Journal of Social and Political Sciences, 26(2), pp. 233–250. Available at:https://doi.org/10.22146/jsp.69241 ↑

  20. Karianto, Y.P.W. & April , F. ( 2024 ) Be Careful on the Road: Vulnerabilities and Strategies of Female Online ojol drivers in Malang City. Women’s Journal, 29(1), pp. 45–63. Available at:https://jurnalperempuan.org/index.php/jp/article/view/2103 ↑

  21. Izzati, N.R. (2022). ‘Misclassified Partnership’ and the Impact of Legal Loophole on Workers. Bestuur, 10(1), pp.57–67. Tersedia di: https://jurnal.uns.ac.id/bestuur/article/view/62066/pdf ↑

  22. Izzati, N.R. (2023). Imbalance of Obligations of the Parties in Online ojolRegulation: Logical Distortion of Gig Economy Partnership Relations. University of Jambi. Available at:https://ujh.unja.ac.id/index.php/home/article/view/734/77 ↑

  23. CNN Indonesia (2025). Find out how many Indonesians are online ojol drivers? How many?, CNN Indonesia, May 21. Available at:https://www.cnnindonesia.com/ekonomi/20250521122803-92-1231525/mencari-tahu-jumlah-orang-ri-yang-jadi-driver-ojol-berapa-banyak ↑

  24. Butler, S. (2021) ‘Uber drivers are workers not self-employed, Supreme Court rules’, The Guardian, 19 Februari. Tersedia di: https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2021/feb/19/uber-drivers-are-workers-not-self-employed-supreme-court-rules ↑

  25. European Commission (2023) Commission welcomes political agreement on improving working conditions in platform work. Brussels: EU Commission. Tersedia di: https://employment-social-affairs.ec.europa.eu/news/commission-welcomes-political-agreement-improving-working-conditions-platform-work-2023-12-13_en ↑