Regulatory Mismatch in Indonesian Media Governance

  • 23/09/2025
  • Category: Commentaries
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Author: Luthfi Baihaqi Riziq
Editor: Bangkit Adhi Wiguna

Introduction

Following the revision of the Broadcasting Bill (Revisi Undang-Undang (RUU) Penyiaran No. 32 Tahun 2002), the Indonesian government is on its way to fully encapsulate all forms of media in its regulatory framework. A problem has emerged regarding its ambition to control user-generated content (e.g. TikTok, Instagram) and over-the-top (OTT) media (e.g. Netflix, Disney+ Hotstar) the same way it does on conventional broadcasting services. The bill revision is currently still ongoing, and the 2024 publicly available draft will be subject to comment here.[1]

Tensions with Media Companies

The rationale behind the bill was threefold. First, it argues, surveillance on media is important to protect kids from consuming inappropriate content.[2] Second, the algorithm prefers globally attractive content, shoving local content down the recommender system.[3] Third, more regulation should be imposed on platforms to maintain the ecosystem of mainstream broadcasting media.[4]

TikTok has voiced partial rejection of this regulation, saying the government should not conflate TV or radio broadcasts to user-generated content (UGC) they are trying to accommodate. They are not the same thing, and ultimately follow different logics of governance. TikTok proposes that the government design separate bills to regulate mainstream media, UGC, and OTT services.[5]

A member of the parliament, Amelia Anggraini, refuses this recommendation. She insists that the conflation in this revision is beneficial, legally speaking, citing lengthy procedures for new bills and the urgency of the issue. The bill has rightly targeted what it is supposed to: broadcasts, regardless of form, producers, and business models.[6] It will be up to the corresponding body, Komdigi or KPI (Komisi Penyiaran Indonesia/Indonesian Broadcasting Commission), to break down the mechanisms for each.

At the heart of the issue is the government’s proposal to big tech companies, namely Google, YouTube, X, Meta, and Tiktok, to give Komdigi and KPI access to their algorithmic video system.[7] They demanded transparency of the algorithm as a preventive measure. This shows the government is keeping their eyes on another thing. Instead of focusing solely on the content of the media, it has shown interest in keeping the platforms’ algorithm in check.

A Shift to Infrastructure-Based Regulation?

The bill signals a transformation in how the state wants to govern the media landscape, shifting from older analog-era logics to algorithmic governmentality, a mode of governance that operates through data infrastructures and algorithmic predictions.[8] In other words, the government does not want to simply control content and its matter, but rather the systems that shape what content is made visible. In this way, control will be exercised less through overt laws, and more through the automated management of what citizens see and engage with on their respective social media feeds.

This shift is especially evident in the government’s insistence on accessing the algorithms of UGC platforms like TikTok, even giving them several warnings to comply.[9] Unlike traditional content-based regulation, which focuses on removing or classifying individual content (e.g. banning pornography or fake news), infrastructure-based regulation targets the underlying mechanisms, such as content recommendation systems. Rather than punishing it, it wants to pre-emptively and systemically shape content production.

If TikTok and other UGC companies comply, the government will have access to their visibility algorithm, thereby shaping what goes viral and what keeps drowned out. The government will also have access to platform’s moderation flows, personalization mechanisms, and data inputs or user behavior. This leads to broader population control over affect, taste, and discourse, eliminating the need for manual interference with each piece of content.

Yet, this is complicated by the fact that broadcasting, OTT platforms, and UGC services all follow different media logics. Traditional broadcasting, mainly TV and radio, operates with centralized programming and licensing. On the other hand, OTT platforms function on catalog models for subscribers to choose on-demand, while sometimes producing in-house programs. Contrasting the former two, UGC platforms host media shared by users and rely on constant, algorithmically-ranked user input. To govern them in the same centralized way risks regulatory mismatch. It would also extend KPI’s P3-SPS (Pedoman Perilaku Penyiaran & Standar Program Siaran/Broadcasting Code of Conduct & Broadcasting Program Standard) rules to OTT and UGC, which are harder to regulate due to their scale and decentralization. One of the ambiguous rules in P3-SPS bans media that “disturb civility and decency norms” without giving clear criteria to define it.[10]

Taking a step further, the latest draft of the bill revision instructs KPI to formulate a new standard for media broadcasting called the SIS (Standar Isi Siaran/Broadcasting Content Standard) which is to be based on the previous P3-SPS. In the bill, the SIS is obligated to maintain explicit prohibition, which includes homosexual content and mystical aspects in media, hindering LGBT and Indigenous expression. It also forbids “defamation”, again without clear criteria, which risks being used in politically motivated content takedowns as happened with the infamous ITE Bill.

The Indonesian government would perceive this move as following the U.S. policy model, in collapsing these categories into one policy framework. Suko Widodo, communications and media observer, stated how digital platforms and conventional broadcasting have converged.[11] To adapt, the U.S. government puts surveillance over every form of broadcasting through its Federal Communications Commission (FCC).[12] Indonesian dilation of KPI into a “super body” follows the same pattern.

However, there are other models in media governance to consider. Another option is how the EU handles media services with their AVMSD (Audiovisual Media Services Directive).[13] Responding to media convergence, they amended the AVMSD to now include on-demand services and video-sharing platforms. But, the Directive defines each media logic and approaches them differently to suit how their business works. To implement it, the EU does not deploy a centralized body, but rather transfers authority to its member states. For the Indonesian government, following this move would mean crafting a bill which tackles the three services, but explicitly and with nuance.

The risk of conflating media types under one bill can lead to overbroad, vague, and possibly authoritarian regulations that extend government power over everyday media consumption. Critics such as Remotivi[14] and other journalist organizations[15] have been vocal in expressing concerns toward the revisions of the bill. When all forms of media fall under one “broadcasting” law, the legal tools can become blunt and potentially repressive. Convergence of media should not be responded to with lazy policymaking.

Conclusion

The debate surrounding the revision bill is yet to be over. The bill highlights a tension between a unified framework and infrastructural differences of conventional broadcasting, OTT platforms, and UGC services. It’s important to note that the Indonesian government is not naive. It recognizes the power of algorithms and is trying to adapt. However, we may wonder whether its current tools and frameworks are adequate to govern notably complex algorithms to protect citizens.

  1. The drafts are available here: bit.ly/ruupenyiaran. Compiled and shared by Remotivi in a tweet, accessible here: https://x.com/remotivi/status/1788472201488027997 ↑
  2. Komisi Penyiaran Indonesia. (2025, May 6). RUU Penyiaran: Keniscayaan untuk semua. https://kpi.go.id/id/umum/38-dalam-negeri/37707-ruu-penyiaran-keniscayaan-untuk-semua ↑
  3. kumparanNEWS. (2025, March 10). RUU Penyiaran akan atur algoritma distribusi konten digital dan kompensasi. https://kumparan.com/kumparannews/ruu-penyiaran-akan-atur-algoritma-distribusi-konten-digital-dan-kompensasi-24eWPPrheag/1 ↑
  4. Andini, R. (2025, July 21). Media mainstream harus diselamatkan lewat RUU Penyiaran. RMOL. https://rmol.id/politik/read/2025/07/21/673636/media-mainstream-harus-diselamatkan-lewat-ruu-penyiaran ↑
  5. ERA.id. (2025, July 15). TikTok ogah diatur dalam RUU Penyiaran, ini alasannya. https://era.id/nasional/179341/tiktok-ogah-diatur-dalam-ruu-penyiaran-ini-alasannya ↑
  6. kumparanNEWS. (2025, July 15). Debat Komisi I dengan TikTok karena tak mau diatur di RUU Penyiaran. https://kumparan.com/kumparannews/debat-komisi-i-dengan-tiktok-karena-tak-mau-diatur-di-ruu-penyiaran-25SpYVk9ceT/4 ↑
  7. CNN Indonesia. (2025, July 17). DPR usul Komdigi bisa akses algoritma konten medsos di RUU Penyiaran. https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20250716072937-32-1251170/dpr-usul-komdigi-bisa-akses-algoritma-konten-medsos-di-ruu-penyiaran ↑
  8. Milan, S. (2024). Commentary: Taking to machines: Knowledge production and social relations in the age of governance by data infrastructure. In J. Jarke, B. Prietl, S. Egbert, Y. Boeva, H. Heuer, & M. Arnold (Eds.), Algorithmic regimes: Methods, interactions, and politics (pp. 229-238). Amsterdam University Press. ↑
  9. Rizky, D. (2025, July 21). Komisi I DPR siapkan langkah serius jika TikTok ogah tunduk dalam RUU Penyiaran. inilah.com. https://www.inilah.com/komisi-i-dpr-siapkan-langkah-serius-jika-tiktok-ogah-tunduk-dalam-ruu-penyiaran ↑
  10. See Standar Program Siaran, Chapter 5 Article 9. The full P3-SPS can be accessed here: https://www.kpi.go.id/download/regulasi/P3SPS_2012_Final.pdf ↑
  11. Sukarjito. (2025, July 27). Revisi UU Penyiaran, DPR diminta tiru regulasi model AS. Beritasatu.com. https://www.beritasatu.com/nasional/2907851/revisi-ruu-penyiaran-dpr-diminta-tiru-regulasi-model-as ↑
  12. For more discussion on media convergence and Western regulatory approaches, see Winseck, D. (20). The broken internet and platform regulation: Promises and perils. In T. Flew & F. R. Martin (Eds.), Digital platform regulation: Global perspectives on internet governance (pp. 229-257). Palgrave Macmillan. ↑
  13. The European Union’s Audiovisual Media Service Directive can be accessed here: https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/audiovisual-and-media-services ↑
  14. Remotivi. (2024). Mengapa RUU Penyiaran harus ditolak?. https://www.remotivi.or.id/aktivitas/proyek/lampau-25 ↑
  15. Joharsoyo, Y. M., Saputra, E. Y., Faturahman, A. A., & Paramitha, D. D. (2024, May 14). Kritik Dewan Pers, PWI, dan AJI terhadap draf RUU Penyiaran. Tempo. https://www.tempo.co/hukum/kritik-dewan-pers-pwi-dan-aji-terhadap-draf-ruu-penyiaran-59188 ↑