Militarized AI in the New Age of Wars: Functionality and Geopolitical Contestation

  • 11/09/2025
  • Category: Commentaries
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military ai

Author: Emira Anjani
Editor: Achmed Faiz Yudha Siregar

As wars persist, so too does the relentless drive to refine weaponry, with each generation seeking greater efficiency, precision, and reach. The incorporation of new technologies fuels this constant evolution, as militaries race to exploit scientific and industrial advances to secure an upper hand. Within this process, AI has emerged as a pivotal force, transforming not only how weapons function but also how wars are conceived, waged, and sustained. At the same time, major powers such as the U.S., Russia, and China have demonstrated particular interest in using AI to enhance military capabilities—improving accuracy, lethality, efficiency, and reducing human error.[1]

Arms and weapons become the tools of negotiation when dialogue fails and conflicts of interest escalate. The difficult reality is that, whether violence is carried out in the name of justice, peace, or political legitimacy, the asymmetry of power and military capability ultimately shapes the outcome. Weapons embody this dynamic because they carry not only destructive potential but also the capacity to impose dominance. Contemporary conflicts such as atrocities in Palestine, Ukraine, and Myanmar, alongside rising tension between Iran and Israel, and brief hostilities along the Cambodia-Thailand border, illustrate the persistence of practiced violence in the international system. Against this backdrop, this article examines the militarization of a technology now embedded in everyday life, with particular attention to its functionality and its trajectory of development.

Militarization of AI

The militarization of AI has not yet been distinctly categorized as a separate field; rather, it is generally subsumed under the broader framework of computational integration in weaponry. Within this framework, the application of computational technology is assessed according to varying degrees of autonomy. In the military context, being ‘autonomous’ refers to a system that, once activated, can independently identify, select, and engage targets without direct human control.[2] More advanced iterations not only operate without human intervention but also possess adaptive capabilities, allowing them to learn from and adjust to changing battlefield conditions, including the capacity to make firing decisions autonomously.[3]

Situated along the continuum of autonomy, there are three big ideas in the development of computerized weaponry.[4] The Direct Operator Control (DOC), in which humans maintain direct physical control through constant contact with the machine; Teleoperator Control, which removes the need for physical contact but still requires human oversight through remote operation; and Structured Control, which represents the closest step toward fully autonomous weaponry.[5]

DOC and Teleoperator incorporate minimal to zero AI systems in a meaningful way, but placed greater emphasis on mechanization or computationalization. Structured Control systems, however, emphasize humans’ willingness to transfer their decision-making power diminished as machines become capable of self-programming, rendering human oversight less relevant. These systems integrate artificial vision and sensor technologies to respond dynamically to environmental stimuli by relying on advanced sensor networks and computer vision, enabling them to adapt and respond autonomously to changes in their surroundings.[6]

The amalgamation of machine learning, computer vision, and advanced sensor technologies enables Structured Controlled systems to detect, classify targets, and navigate complex environments to determine the appropriate action in the absence of human oversight and control.[7] Hence, Structured Controlled systems are largely employed for tasks such as command and control, surveillance, reconnaissance, cyber-attacks, planning/training, and logistics.[8] This operational independence distinguishes Structured Controlled from DOC and Teleoperator Control by displacing human judgement to an algorithm in the critical moment of lethal decision-making; thereby altering the traditional relationship between humans, machines, and the use of force.

The tangible manifestations of Structured Control systems are generally referred to as Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (LAWS)––or in a more unsettling term: ‘killer robots.’ The exceptional efficiency of autonomous weapons, coupled with their remarkably minimal response time, has compelled states to incorporate this emerging technology into their defense strategies. Examples include the advancement of missile-defence systems, from computerized Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) and Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) into the U.S.’s Patriot Missile System and the Israeli Iron Dome. The latter had been deployed recently in the Israel-Iran conflict; dozens of videos showcasing the sheer reactionary speed of the weapon in intercepting incoming rockets, allowing the lethal blast to occur on air instead of land. Another notable example include loitering munitions (also known as suicide drone or Kamikaze drone), a type of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) designed to loiter until designated targets are detected.[9] The Turkish loitering munition, the Bayraktar TB2, had been used as intelligence to monitor the strikes on Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and People’s Protection Unit (YPG) in Iraq and Syria.[10] The same weapons were deployed by the Ukrainian military during the Russian invasion; and by the Ethiopian military in the Tigray War.[11] Another manifestation of this development is the South Korean Samsung SGR-A1 Sentry Gun, which had been deployed in the Korean Demilitarized Zone as an all-in weapon: surveillance, tracking, firing, and voice recognition.[12]

Despite differences in their specific functions, ranging from missile interception to unmanned aerial strikes and automated sentry operations, these systems converge in their reliance on advanced computational technologies, sensor fusion, and networked coordination to optimize operational effectiveness. While the integration of artificial intelligence (AI) is increasingly enhancing precision and efficiency, it can also reduce direct human involvement in combat, thereby altering the scale and manner of modern warfare. Ultimately, such systems exemplify how AI-driven autonomy transforms military capabilities into force multipliers, enabling states to project power more strategically within a digitalized and network-centric battlespace.

The Race for LAWS: the Big Picture

The last century demonstrated that technological superiority is the stamp of power in international politics, as Putin declared: “whoever becomes the leader in the [AI] sphere will become the ruler of the world”.[13] In this manner, the militarization of AI cannot be separated from geopolitical contestation among major powers; a similar indulgence that defined the greater part of the 20th century. The race of AI militarization had been entered by contending players including the U.S., Russia, and China––all of whom have allotted a magnanimous amount of national funding for research and invention.[14] As an unfolding event, the exact status quo is hard to determine, but developments prevailed nevertheless.

In the big picture, the U.S. enjoyed a leading edge over its rivals because the American military had begun research and development of AI since the Cold War. As other nations accelerated their commitment to AI development, however, Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel stipulated in 2014 thatr the American Military make AI a critical aspect of the current military doctrine.[15] The command to augment AI capabilities in the military is partially predisposed by the abrupt acceleration of AI development in Russia and China–two of America’s primary rivals. Hence, the Joint Artificial Intelligence Centre (JAIC) was established in 2018 to monitor thousands of AI projects in the nation; at the same time the Department of Defense Artificial Intelligence Strategy was also established to navigate the strengthening of the U.S.’s militarized AI capacity and as an additional layer of protection against potential espionage and threats.[16]

Both Russia and China are strong contenders for the U.S. in AI militarization. Russia has taken an assertive approach to the militarization of AI, positioning it as central to its vision of future warfare. Echoing Putin’s endorsement of AI, General Valery Gerasimov has described a battlefield increasingly dominated by adaptive, learning machines.[17] Over the past decade, Russia has demonstrated steady progress in this direction through the establishment of the National Center for Development of Robotics and the Basic elements of Robotics in 2015 under the Foundation for Advanced research projects; the organization of the 2018 “Artificial Intelligence” conference by the Ministry of Economic Development during the ARMY-18 Military Technical Forum; and repeated calls by Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu for greater collaboration between civilian and military sector in advancing AI research.[18] These developments reflect a sustained national commitment to embedding AI within Russia’ s military modernization agenda.

China, by contrast, presents a distinctive case in the global AI race. Its strategy is not focused on competing with the sheer stockpiles of U.S. forces but rather on refining its military capabilities to be more efficient and decisive.[19] China has nevertheless become a frontrunner in AI research for both military and civilian applications. While formally supporting restrictions on the use of LAWS, it resisted proposals to prohibit their development. This stance has facilitated extensive progress in AI-powered stealth drones, hypersonic and supersonic missile systems, autonomous submarine bases and swarming technologies.[20] Hypersonic weapons in particular are widely seen as transformative force multipliers, capable of rendering high-value targets increasingly vulnerable while themselves evading interception. Similarly, autonomous submarines strengthen China’s second-strike capability, consolidating its strategic position in contested areas such as the South China Sea.

The progression from operator-dependent systems to fully autonomous platforms underscores a decisive shift in the logic of warfare. Whereas earlier computational integration served primarily to extend human capabilities, contemporary AI-driven systems increasingly supplant human judgment altogether, embedding algorithmic decision-making into the core combat operations. This shift is not merely technical; it recalibrates the relationship between humans, machines, and the use of force, transforming speed, adaptability, and predictive capacity into the new determinants of military power.

Furthermore, it can be argued that taken together, the trajectories of the U.S., Russia, and China illustrate how the militarization of AI is a blend of technological inevitability, enduring geopolitical rivalry, and structural transformation in strategic competition. What distinguishes this competition from earlier military races is the competition is not a matter of magnitude and scale of destruction, but rather accuracy and autonomy, which recalibrates both the speed and scope of warfare. AI not only multiplies military power but also compresses reaction times to a degree that challenges established doctrines of deterrence and escalation management. In this sense, the contest over AI supremacy is not merely about achieving battlefield advantage, but about reshaping the strategic architecture of global security itself.

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  1. Marwala, Tshilidzi. “Militarization of AI Has Severe Implications for Global Security and Warfare.” United Nations University 24 (2023). ↑
  2. Allen, Gregory. “DOD Is Updating Its Decade-Old Autonomous Weapons Policy, but Confusion Remains Widespread.” www.csis.org, June 6, 2022. https://www.csis.org/analysis/dod-updating-its-decade-old-autonomous-weapons-policy-confusion-remains-widespread. ↑
  3. Roff, Heather. “Lethal Autonomous Weapons and Jus Ad Bellum Proportionality Lethal Autonomous Weapons and Jus Ad Bellum Proportionality.” Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 47 (2015). https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=1006&context=jil. ↑
  4. Arif, Shaza. “Militarization of Artificial Intelligence: Progress and Implications.” In Towards an International Political Economy of Artificial Intelligence, edited by Tugrul Keskin and Ryan David Kiggins, 219–39. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1007/9783030744205_10; ↑
  5. cs.stanford.edu. “History & Development of Autonomous Weapons,” n.d. https://cs.stanford.edu/people/eroberts/cs181/projects/autonomous-weapons/html/history.html; ↑
  6. Scharre, Paul. Army of None: Autonomous Weapons and the Future of War. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2019; International Committee of the Red Cross. “International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Position on Autonomous Weapon Systems: ICRC Position and Background Paper.” International Review of the Red Cross, January 1, 2022. https://international-review.icrc.org/articles/icrc-position-on-autonomous-weapon-systems-icrc-position-and-background-paper-915. ↑
  7. Ministry of Defence. “Unmanned Aircraft Systems (JDP 0-30.2).” GOV.UK, September 12, 2017. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/unmanned-aircraft-systems-jdp-0-302; United Nations . “Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (LAWS).” United Nations, 2023. https://disarmament.unoda.org/the-convention-on-certain-conventional-weapons/background-on-laws-in-the-ccw/. ↑
  8. Carlson, Kristofer J. “THE MILITARY APPLICATION of ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE.” Research Gate, August 21, 2019. https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.10243.45601. ↑
  9. Mineo, Liz. “‘Killer Robots’ Are Coming, and U.N. Is Worried.” Harvard Gazette, January 12, 2024. https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2024/01/killer-robots-are-coming-and-u-n-is-worried/. ↑
  10. Daily Sabah. “Turkey’s Bayraktar TB2 Drones Enable Swift, Precise Victory against YPG/PKK in Syria’s Afrin.” Daily Sabah, April 18, 2018. https://www.dailysabah.com/war-on-terror/2018/04/19/turkeys-bayraktar-tb2-drones-enable-swift-precise-victory-against-ypgpkk-in-syrias-afrin. ↑
  11. Corcoran, Kieran. “Ukraine Credits Turkish Drones with Eviscerating Russian Tanks and Armor in Their First Use in a Major Conflict.” Business Insider, February 27, 2022. https://www.businessinsider.com/ukraine-hypes-bayraktar-drone-as-videos-show-destroyed-russia-tanks-2022-2; Bearak, Max, Meg Kelly, and Joyce Sohyun Lee. “How Ethiopia Used a Turkish Drone in a Strike That Killed Nearly 60 Civilians.” Washington Post, February 7, 2022. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/interactive/2022/ethiopia-tigray-dedebit-drone-strike/. ↑
  12. Kumagai, Jean. “A Robotic Sentry for Korea’s Demilitarized Zone.” IEEE Spectrum, March 1, 2007. https://spectrum.ieee.org/a-robotic-sentry-for-koreas-demilitarized-zone. ↑
  13. Russia Today. “‘Whoever Leads in AI Will Rule the World’: Putin to Russian Children on Knowledge Day.” RT International. RT, September 2017. https://www.rt.com/news/401731-ai-rule-world-putin/. ↑
  14. Arif, Shaza. “Militarization of Artificial Intelligence: Progress and Implications.” In Towards an International Political Economy of Artificial Intelligence, edited by Tugrul Keskin and Ryan David Kiggins, 219–39. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1007/9783030744205_10; ↑
  15. Ellman, Jesse. “Assessing the Third Offset Strategy.” Center of Strategic and International Studies 2 (2017). https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/170302_Ellman_ThirdOffsetStrategySummary_Web.pdf%3fEXO1GwjFU22_Bkd5A.nx.fJXTKRDKbVR.; Knapp, Brandon. “Here’s Where the Pentagon Wants to Invest in Artificial Intelligence in 2019.” C4ISRNet, February 21, 2018. https://www.c4isrnet.com/intel-geoint/2018/02/16/heres-where-the-pentagon-wants-to-invest-in-artificial-intelligence-in-2019/. ↑
  16. Sayler, Kelley M. “Artificial Intelligence and National Security.” Https://Sgp.fas.org/Crs/Natsec/R45178.Pdf. Congressional Research Service, 2019. ↑
  17. Crosston, Dr. Matthew. “THE ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE RACE: US, China, Russia, by Ecatarina Garcia, Modern Diplomacy, April 19, 2018.” Academia.edu, April 20, 2018. https://www.academia.edu/36451550/THE_ARTIFICIAL_INTELLIGENCE_RACE_US_China_Russia_by_Ecatarina_Garcia_Modern_Diplomacy_April_19_2018. ↑
  18. Vadim Kozyulin. “Militarization of AI from a Russian Perspective.” Research Gate. PIR Center (Russian Center for Policy Research), July 12, 2019. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/335422076_Militarization_of_AI_from_a_Russian_Perspective; Arif, Shaza. “Militarization of Artificial Intelligence: Progress and Implications.” In Towards an International Political Economy of Artificial Intelligence, edited by Tugrul Keskin and Ryan David Kiggins, 219–39. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1007/9783030744205_10. ↑
  19. Arif, Shaza. “Militarization of Artificial Intelligence: Progress and Implications.” In Towards an International Political Economy of Artificial Intelligence, edited by Tugrul Keskin and Ryan David Kiggins, 219–39. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1007/9783030744205_10. ↑
  20. Hill, Chase. “China’s Mysterious Underwater Base Features A.I. And Robots.” InsideHook, March 11, 2019. https://www.insidehook.com/daily_brief/news-opinion/chinas-mysterious-underwater-base-features-robots. ↑