- 26/05/2024
- Category: Commentaries
Author: Muhammad Zufar Farhan Zuhdi
Editor: M Perdana Karim
Since September 2023, the General Election Supervisory Agency (Indonesian: Badan Pengawas Pemilihan Umum, Bawaslu) has been in collaboration with TikTok to counteract disinformation and enhance the dissemination of accurate information pertaining to the 2024 Indonesian General Election. The Chairman of Bawaslu, Rahmat Bagja, characterized this collaboration as an innovative initiative with the aim of improving electoral fairness, transparency, and integrity through the application of information technology.[i]
But unfortunately, TikTok was still in the top position as a social media platform that often disseminated hoax content and political disinformation. According to data from News Data Analytics Binocular (Newstensity), TikTok spread around 65% of the total number of hoaxes, while Facebook, X, and YouTube accounted for 19%, 13%, and 3%, respectively.[ii]
Fact-Checking Cooperation Scheme between TikTok Indonesia and Bawaslu RI
TikTok Indonesia’s cooperation with Bawaslu RI is theoretically worth appreciating because it includes four important initiatives. First, TikTok reviewed content through a moderation team based on Community Guidelines to prevent misinformation and hoaxes, especially those related to elections, by limiting their spread on the FYP page. Second, TikTok worked with global and local fact-checkers, including AFP, MAFINDO, and Perludem, to assess content accuracy during the election. Third, TikTok banned paid political advertising and disabled the advertising feature for government, politician, and political party (GPPPA) group accounts to prevent abuse. Finally, TikTok engages the community with the #SalingJaga campaign and educational videos with influencers to advocate for a safe digital space.[iii]
However, despite these initiatives, numerous hoax news videos continue to circulate, with TikTok’s responses often coming too slowly to effectively stem their spread. Among them were the issue of overseas vote count results that have already prematurely come out and appeared in the range of February 8–11, 2024;[iv] contents about KPU no longer issuing physical invitation letters to voters, which began to emerge in the period February 6–11, 2024;[v] and rumors of the Prabowo-Gibran pair on the ballot becoming candidate number 3, which surfaced on February 3–7, 2024.[vi] Before TikTok removed these issues, more than 1 million people viewed them, demonstrating the gaps in social media’s hoax suppression system.[vii]
Between Initiative Expectations and Implementation Realities: Limitations of TikTok and Bawaslu RI in Addressing Misinformation
Despite TikTok’s commitment to combating misinformation, the challenges faced by the social media giant in its implementation are significant and complex.
First, TikTok’s platform faced the daunting task of effectively moderating the speed and volume of content uploaded. TikTok faced challenges in monitoring and verifying rapidly spreading information. Algorithms that prioritize potentially viral yet politically misleading content can accelerate the spread of false information before the moderation team can identify and act on it.[viii]
Second, cooperation with fact-checkers required intricate and rapid coordination between TikTok’s internal moderation team and external fact-checking agencies.[ix] Issues include the validation of information sources and the need for an immediate response, which is sometimes difficult to achieve in a very short period of time, especially when misinformation is already widespread.
Third, avoiding the use of platforms for political advertising was a progressive step, but monitoring its implementation is particularly challenging, especially when political actors found new ways to spread their messages using covert methods.[x] In order to evade automatic detection filters and Community Guidelines standards, hoaxes and disinformation often rely on ambiguous language or insinuation instead of direct factual statements, making their identification as hoaxes more difficult.
Synergizing Systemic and Participatory Approaches to Improving Political Literacy and Digital Fact Verification in Future Elections
There needs to be a balance between two important approaches to improving and optimizing political literacy and digital fact-checking for future elections.
First, a top-down institutional systemic approach by TikTok Indonesia and Bawaslu RI in formulating more adaptive anti-hoax Community Guidelines and developing algorithms that are more discerning to political content during election periods. We should design these algorithms to quickly identify and disable the dissemination of potentially disruptive or misinformative content. Increasing the capacity of machine learning to detect language nuances and specific local contexts can help achieve this goal. In addition, real-time integration with external fact-checking agencies approved by Bawaslu would allow TikTok to authenticate information in a more time-sensitive manner. Instant verification stamps on vetted content, along with the flagging and further assessment of suspected hoaxes, are possible through such a collaboration method.
Second, a bottom-up participatory community approach that emphasizes the active participation of the public in reporting suspicious content. There are various ways to achieve this, such as partnering with more local fact-checking agencies, implementing intensive digital education and media literacy programs for the community, and developing an in-app verification feature that empowers TikTok users as ‘first responders’ to label and note videos they consider to contain false or misleading information about the election, similar to the Community Notes feature on social media X. Given the profound influence of social media content on shaping individuals’ political preferences and their ability to exercise democratic rights, it is imperative to regulate misinformation diligently. Effective control and verification of online information are not just about preserving the integrity of elections; they are crucial for empowering voters to make informed and meaningful choices in the political arena.
[i] Pradana, J. (2023) Tanda Tangani MoU dengan Tiktok, Bawaslu Dapat Kanal Khusus untuk Lawan Penyebaran Hoaks dan Misinformasi, Bawaslu RI. Available at: https://bawaslu.go.id/id/berita/tanda-tangani-mou-dengan-tiktok-bawaslu-dapat-kanal-khusus-untuk-lawan-penyebaran-hoaks-dan (Accessed: 2024).
[ii] Warta Ekonomi (2023) Masih Sangat Besar, TikTok Jadi Sarang Peredaran Hoaks Pemilu 2024, Warta Ekonomi. Available at: https://wartaekonomi.co.id/read528673/masih-sangat-besar-tiktok-jadi-sarang-peredaran-hoaks-pemilu-2024 (Accessed: 2024).
[iii] Republika (2023) Jaga Integritas Pemilu, TikTok Lakukan Upaya Ini, Republika. Available at: https://www.republika.id/posts/50197/jaga-integritas-pemilu-tiktok-lakukan-upaya-ini (Accessed: 2024).
[iv] Kominfo RI (2024a) [HOAKS] Hasil Exit Poll Pemilu 2024 di Luar Negeri, Kominfo RI. Available at: https://www.kominfo.go.id/content/detail/54701/hoaks-hasil-exit-poll-pemilu-2024-di-luar-negeri/0/laporan_isu_hoaks (Accessed: 2024).
[v] Kominfo RI (2024b) Pemilu 2024 Tidak Menggunakan Undangan Fisik, Kominfo RI. Available at: https://www.kominfo.go.id/content/detail/54688/hoaks-pemilu-2024-tidak-menggunakan-undangan-fisik/0/laporan_isu_hoaks (Accessed: 2024).
[vi] Kominfo RI (2024c) [HOAKS] Video ‘Prabowo Subianto-Gibran Rakabuming Raka Nomor Urut 03’, Kominfo RI. Available at: https://www.kominfo.go.id/content/detail/54541/hoaks-video-prabowo-subianto-gibran-rakabuming-raka-nomor-urut-03/0/laporan_isu_hoaks (Accessed: 2024).
[vii] Fauzan, R. (2024) TikTok Peringkat Pertama Sebagai Distributor Hoaks Pemilu 2024 Terbanyak Artikel ini telah tayang di Bisnis.com dengan judul “TikTok Peringkat Pertama Sebagai Distributor Hoaks Pemilu 2024 Terbanyak, Bisnis Tekno. Available at: https://teknologi.bisnis.com/read/20240213/266/1740490/tiktok-peringkat-pertama-sebagai-distributor-hoaks-pemilu-2024-terbanyak (Accessed: 2024).
[viii] Patnaik, S. and Litan, R. (2023) Policy Brief – May 2023, Center on Regulation and Markets at Brookings. Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/20230511_CRM_PatnaikLitan_TikTok_FINAL.pdf (Accessed: 2024).
[ix] Nuralam, C. (2020) 3 Tantangan Berat Tim Cek Fakta Berantas Hoaks di Asia Tenggara, Liputan6.com. Available at: https://www.liputan6.com/cek-fakta/read/4395860/3-tantangan-berat-tim-cek-fakta-berantas-hoaks-di-asia-tenggara?page=5 (Accessed: 2024)
[x] Rogers, R. (2023) The propagation of misinformation in Social Media [Preprint]. doi:10.5117/9789463720762.
