- 28/02/2023
- Category: Commentaries
Author: M Irfan Dwi Putra
Editor: Alfredo Putrawidjoyo
The 2024 General Election is just around the corner. Political discourse is rising everywhere—from the grassroots to the elite. Many parties have begun to close ranks and form partisan groups. The names of potential rulers[i] have begun to emerge. Some have even declared themselves as presidential candidates.[ii] All this marks the dawn of Indonesia’s political year.
The pandemic has changed many people’s activities, including increasing the number of internet users in Indonesia. According to the Indonesian Internet Profile 2022 released by the Indonesian Association of Internet Service Providers (APJII), the internet penetration rate in Indonesia reached 77.02 per cent in 2022. Compared to 2018, this number has increased by almost 13 per cent.[iii] This post-pandemic situation can potentially intensify the linkages between the digital and politics, especially in the 2024 General Election. The stage is set for political propagandists with over a decade of experience to make a comeback in 2024. Under the guise of freedom of speech, they use anonymous accounts to spread disinformation that polarizes the public. They are the buzzers.
In digital politics, “buzzer” refers to people who produce and distribute campaign information through social media. Political elites occasionally hire them to gain support and influence public opinion.[iv] However, political elites never admit to doing so, and buzzers often claim they are unpaid.[v] In Indonesia, buzzers have been used for political campaigns since early 2012 during the DKI Jakarta gubernatorial election. This continued during the 2014 General Election and became increasingly massive five years later during the 2019 General Election.[vi]
The current Indonesian General Election Law does not explicitly prohibit using buzzers to campaign on social media. However, buzzers have become a public concern because they spread disinformation that contains defamation, manipulated content, and hate speech. At some point, the disinformation they spread polarizes society and creates negative sentiments toward certain groups. This, of course, poses a threat to the harmony of Indonesian society, causing friction not only in cyberspace but also in real life.
Several provisions under Indonesian law may be enforceable against buzzers who spread disinformation. Such provisions include Article 280 of the General Election Law on campaign prohibitions,[vii] Article 27 paragraph (3) of the EIT Law on online defamation,[viii] and Article 28 paragraph (2) of the EIT Law on hate speech towards ethnicity, religion, race, and inter-group.[ix] However, imposing these rules on buzzers is quite challenging because they mostly use anonymous identities, making them difficult to track.[x]
If the existing legal instruments cannot address this issue, is it possible to take down buzzers from social media during the campaign period? Well, it depends because more questions will come up to answer that question. Who has the authority to do the takedown? What criteria should determine whether a buzzer account can be taken down? Moreover, what is the mechanism for a takedown? Will the takedown violate freedom of speech? Although these buzzer accounts can be taken down, they can just create new accounts. Given this fact and the potential for increased use of buzzers for campaigning in the 2024 elections, a multi-forum approach is needed to deal with this issue. This multi-forum approach must involve various parties, from the government to the public.
The most important step in addressing this issue is to improve the public’s digital literacy skills. This includes, but is not limited to, receiving, processing, verifying, and validating information. Improving digital literacy skills can be done by conducting workshops on digital literacy. The government–represented by the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology–needs to intensify the SiBerkreasi program to improve the public’s digital literacy skills. In addition, election administrators–particularly the General Election Commission (KPU) and the Election Supervisory Agency (Bawaslu)–also need to take several measures, such as providing channels to correct election-related disinformation and spreading counter-narratives on issues that are often used for disinformation.[xi]
Another stakeholder that needs to be involved in dealing with spreading disinformation is non-governmental and other related organizations. NGOs can provide recommendations to the authorities on topics vulnerable to disinformation and spread counter-narratives to disinformation.[xii] One of the most vulnerable topics to disinformation is ethnicity, religion, race, and intergroup issues, as it can lead to negative sentiments towards minorities. Disinformation on these issues has created negative sentiments toward the Chinese during the 2017 DKI Jakarta Gubernatorial Election.[xiii]
The next stakeholder is the social media platform. On the one hand, social media becomes a platform where disinformation is created and spread. On the other hand, they also have relatively sophisticated content moderation features and mechanisms. Therefore, they are responsible for moderating content and providing features that contain valid information about the election.[xiv]
Last but not least is the netizen. When receiving information, netizens should not blindly accept it and even share it with others immediately. Netizens must also verify the information and check its validity. If the information turns out to be false, the netizen can report it to the channels provided by the government. In addition, the netizen can also create a counter-narrative to disinformation. As the 2024 General Election approaches, social media may become a means of spreading disinformation that can bring disharmony in society. However, this will be addressed if there is a collaboration between stakeholders. Collaboration between stakeholders in dealing with disinformation will create a peaceful general election and a good democracy.
[i] The term “ruler” is used because of the paradigm shift from government to ruler after the enactment of the Indonesian New Penal Code. See: Jaffrey, S, & Warbuton, E (2022) ‘Indonesia’s new criminal code turns representatives into rulers’ Availabe at: https://www.newmandala.org/representatives-into-rulers/. Accessed: February 23, 2023.
[ii] Teresia, A. (2022) ‘Indonesia’s NasDem party endorses outgoing Jakarta governor for 2024 presidential race’ Availabe at: https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/indonesias-nasdem-party-nominates-anies-baswedan-2024-presidential-race-2022-10-03/. Accessed: February 20, 2023.
[iii] APJII (2022) Profil Internet Indonesia 2022. Jakarta: APJII.
[iv] Saraswati, M.S. (2020) ‘The Political Campaign Industry and the Rise of Disinformation in Indonesia’, in Simpeng, A. and Tapsell, R. (ed.) From Grassroots Activism to Disinformation: Social Media in Southeast Asia. Singapore: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.
[v] Lim, M. (2017) ‘Freedom to hate: social media, algorithmic enclaves, and the rise of tribal nationalism in Indonesia’, Critical Asian Studies, 49, pp. 411-427.
[vi] Saraswati, M.S. (2020) ‘The Political Campaign Industry and the Rise of Disinformation in Indonesia’, in Simpeng, A. and Tapsell, R. (ed.) From Grassroots Activism to Disinformation: Social Media in Southeast Asia. Singapore: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.
[vii] Law of the Republic of Indonesia No. 7 of 2017 on the General Election.
[viii] Law of the Republic of Indonesia No. 11 of 2008 on Electronic Information and Transactions.
[ix] Ibid.
[x] Perbawani, P.S., Rahayu, & Anshari, I.N. (2018) ‘Online Political Participation and Netizen Anonymity in Indonesia’s Digital Democracy’, PCD Journal, 6, pp. 185-212.
[xi] Maharddhika and Salabi, N.A. (2022) Gotong Royong Melawan Disinformasi Pemilu: Rekomendasi Pencegahan dan Penanganan Disinformasi untuk Pemilu dan Pilkada 2024. Jakarta: Perludem.
[xii] Ibid.
[xiii] Lim, M. (2017) ‘Freedom to hate: social media, algorithmic enclaves, and the rise of tribal nationalism in Indonesia’, Critical Asian Studies, 49, pp-411-427.
[xiv] Maharddhika and Salabi, N.A. (2022) Gotong Royong Melawan Disinformasi Pemilu: Rekomendasi Pencegahan dan Penanganan Disinformasi untuk Pemilu dan Pilkada 2024. Jakarta: Perludem.
